This paper documents a dispute involving the freedom of the press that captivated the attention of the Berlin intelligentsia in the 1780s. The dispute provides the socio-historical background for the section in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit entitled “The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition.” (GW, VI.B.II.488-522) The section can also be read as Hegel’s critique of Jacobi. The latter’s presence in the Phenomenology, although not pervasive, is at least conspicuous.

Conjectures for the text of three passages in Martial (5, 11, 1; 5, 20, 6-7; 5, 38, 3), with critical notes on the ‚new Gaius‘, inst. 3, 154a-b (P.S.I. XI, 1182, A14-B42).

Nel 1516 Leone X sfuggì di misura a un’incursione di pirati musulmani mentre cacciava sul litorale romano.1 Presumibilmente gli incursori non si accorsero di quanto preziosa fosse la preda che avevano mancato. E noi non riusciamo neppure a immaginare le conseguenze di una simile cattura: ci vorrebbe un intero libro di storia controfattuale. Il rischio inaudito corso dal papa confermava la vulnerabilità dell’Europa cristiana, e addirittura del suo centro, Roma, che la frattura religiosa del Mediterraneo aveva trasformato in un avamposto (...) proteso verso gli infedeli. Il tema era presente nella mente di Leone X almeno da quando Paolo Giustiniani e Pietro Quirini gli avevano dato risalto nel 1513. Delle sei parti in cui .. (shrink)

An overview of current scholarship in ontology places one before two parallel lines that never meet: on the one hand there are essays in so-called “analytic ontology”, on the other hand, there are studies developed within so-called Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology. However, even though it is frequently ignored, there is an interesting philosophical current of thought within so-called “analytical Thomism”, which joins contemporary debates of “analytic ontology” from the perspective of an Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology. The main contributors to this current are P. Geach (...) and B. Miller, who have proposed a new theory about existence, called “two sense theory”. It is a view intermediate between the well known Fregean and Meinongian views, arguing for the possibility of two senses of “exists”: as first- and as second-order predicate. The object of this paper is to present this current of thought, and to evaluate it from the point of view of the history of ontology and of “continental” Thomism. (shrink)

Spirito dell'Europa, spirito del cristianesimo : momenti della discussione / J.B. Metz -- Il rapimento dell'Europa e la teologia / H.J. Adriaanse -- L'Europa ipocrita / J. Greisch -- Condizioni dell'apporto di filosofia e teologia al progresso dell'Europa / J.P. Coll -- Teologia e filosofia : le vicende di un rapporto difficile / G. Colombo -- Dall'ermeneutica filosofica all'ermeneutica teologica / C. Geffré -- Antropologie filosofiche e teologiche / J. Macquarrie -- Ermeneutica della differenza / A. Rigobello -- Dalla teologia (...) alla filosofia / X. Tilliette -- Filosofia e teologia : una distinzione superata / R. Panikkar -- Il giudizio finale come problema di filosofia della religione / O. Bayer -- Mistica e illuminismo, affinità e contrasto / E. Salmann -- Sum ergo Deus est : il finito di fronte all'infinito / U. Perone -- La conoscenza come conoscenza di Dio : aspetti epistemologici della teoria dell'intelletto di Meister Eckhart / U. Kern. (shrink)

La raccolta di saggi di estetica analitica curata da Giovanni Matteucci è introdotta da un contributo di Paolo D’Angelo che conclude: “la reciproca ignoranza che caratterizza l’estetica analitica e quella ‘continentale’ (loro non ci leggono, noi non li leggiamo) è forse più di una stranezza: è uno scandalo che non sarebbe considerato tollerabile in qualsiasi settore della ricerca scientifica”. Per cominciare a rispondere allo “scandalo”, che è più italiano che d’Oltralpe, Elementi di estetica...

This article argues that Robert Alexy's influential theory of balancing is affected by a contradiction that makes it unfeasible as an instrument by which to explain some aspects of law and legal reasoning it aims to clarify. In particular, I will show that one of the premises of Alexy's theory of balancing is incompatible with its conclusion. Alexy's theory is based upon a sharp distinction between rules and principles. However, as my analysis will demonstrate, its conclusion implies that it is (...) impossible to distinguish between rules and principles. This is because the so‐called weight formula and the law of colliding principles (i.e., the two main notions used by Alexy to explain balancing) cancel out any difference between these two types of norms. (shrink)

Il cinquantennio a cavallo tra '200 e '300 rappresenta il periodo più stimolante e creativo per la riflessione sul rapporto tra necessità e contingenza e tra intelletto e volontà. L'A. analizza la difesa compiuta da Giovanni della tesi scotista sulla contingenza della fruizione beatifica, ossia sulla possibilità che il beato, in presenza della stessa essenza divina, possa mantenere la propria capacità di scelta, al punto tale da poter essere in grado di non abbandonarsi all'amore verso di Dio. Prima di (...) analizzare in modo più dettagliato il pensiero del Reading, l'A. passa in rassegna le posizioni di Duns Scoto, Roberto Cowton, Riccardo di Conington, Guglielmo d'Occam, Pietro Aureolo che, in terra francese, diversamente da Francesco di Meyronnes e Giovanni di Bassoles, non aderì alla tesi scotista della contingenza della fruizione. All'interno di questo programma teorico Reading si oppone innanzitutto ai teologi inglesi che, legati a posizioni tradizionali, sostenevano la necessità in via come in patria della fruizione del sommo bene colto come concetto o contemplato come essenza. In appendice vien pubblicata l'ed. della sesta quaestio della prima distinctio del Commento alle Sentenze di Giovanni Reading basata sul ms. Firenze, B.N.C., Conv. Soppr. D IV 95. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

According to Reid, opinions that contradict the principles of common sense are not only false but also absurd. Nature has given us an emotion that reveals the absurdity of an opinion: the emotion of ridicule. An appeal to ridicule in philosophical arguments may easily be discounted as a logical fallacy in the same manner as an appeal to the common consent of people. This essay traces the origins of Reid's defense of ridicule in the works of Addison, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and (...) Campbell. Reid rejected a non-epistemic view of the sense of ridicule. According to Reid, ridicule includes both a feeling and a particular act of judgment based on the principles of common sense. (shrink)

Thomas Reid is the foremost exponent of the Scottish 'common sense' school of philosophy. Educated at Marischal College in Aberdeen, Reid subsequently taught at King’s College, and was a founder of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. His Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense was published in 1764, the same year he succeeded Adam Smith as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He resigned from active teaching duties in 1785 to devote himself to writing, (...) and published two more books — Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man and Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Within a short time of publication, Reid’s works were translated into French and German, and greatly influenced debates in philosophy and psychology in Europe. His influence in the emerging colleges and universities of post-revolutionary America was even greater. Reid was widely regarded as David Hume’s most sophisticated contemporary critic. His critique of the "theory of ideas", that lay behind both Hume’s scepticism and Berkeley’s immaterialism, his critique of Locke’s theory of personal identity, and his defence of “moral liberty” against determinism, are all of enduring interest and significance. The aim of this comprehensive selection of his writings is to make the key elements of Reid’s philosophical work available to a new generation of readers. Two other philosophers of the ‘common sense’ school are featured in the Library of Scottish Philosophy— James Beattie and Dugald Stewart. (shrink)

O presente ensaio, aqui publicado em tradução original para Português, constitui uma secção muito significativa da conhecida obra de Giovanni B. Sala sobre Lonergan e a sua relação com Kant. Trata-se de um estudo comparativo das teorias do conhecimento de Immanuel Kant e de Bernard Lonergan, tomando-se como ponto de partida uma análise do estatuto do a priori no conhecimento humano tal como no-lo apresenta a Crítica da Razão Pura, de Kant, para depois se apresentarem as respectivas lacunas, insuficiências (...) e contradições mediante o recurso a Insight, a obra mestra de Bernard Lonergan. Para o filósofo jesuíta, com efeito, o interesse primordial consiste em realçar a possibilidade do conhecimento do ser, possibilidade essa fundamentada na natureza do juízo e na natureza do questionamento humano. Para além disso, mostra-se também como em ordem a ultrapassar a impossibilidade do conhecimento numénico, a reflexão lonerganiana sublinha o conhecimento como estrutura empírica, inteligente, racional e responsável, capaz de captar a realidade, uma vez que esta é, segundo Lonergan, intrinsecamente inteligível. /// The present text is a translation into Portuguese of a section of a work by Giovanni Sala on Lonergan and his relation with Kant. It amounts to a comparative study of the gnoseologies of Kand and Lonergan, whereby the starting point is an analysis of the statute of the a priori in human knowledge such as we find it in the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant, so that in the process the author also shows the corresponding insufficiencies and contradictions by means of a reading of the work Insight by Bernard Lonergan. For the Jesuit philosopher, the main interest of his gnoseology consists in an affirmation of the possibility of knowing being, possibility that is grounded in the nature of judgment itself and in the nature of human interro- gation. Moreover, the article also shows how in order to overcome the impossibility of noumenal knowledge, the lonerganian reflexion underlines knowledge as an empirical structure, intelligent, rational and responsible, able to capture reality. In the end, this is possible due to the fact that, for Lonergan, the real is intrinsically intelligible. (shrink)

Fr. Sala attempts in this article to provide readers and students of Lonergan with a clear, precise, and condensed presentation of his conception of method in theology in today’s context. He does this by sketching the most important stages in the evolution of Lonergan’s thought. The core of this presentation is the analysis of the “human subject in its subjectivity.” Lonergan deals primarily not with the content of theological science but with the operations theologians perform in constructing theology. He endeavors (...) to clarify this subjectivity in all its dimensions. Having given us an analysis of Lonergan’s Verbum articles, Sala goes on to present Lonergan’s Insight under three headings: knowledge, objectivity, and reality. This done, he proceeds to summarize Method in Theology under these headings: the religious dimension of the subject, the structure of theological method, the specific theological principle of a method in theology, and the authentic subject as the foundation for theological reflection.The article is a masterly presentation of a vast area of research and a good introduction to Lonergan’s works.This article appeared in Theologie und Philosophie 63 (1988) 34-59 and was titled: “B. Lonergans Methode der Theologie: Ein Theologe hinterfugt seinen eigenen Verstand.” Von Giovanni B. Sala, S.J. (shrink)

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the human mind (1764), whose axioms are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. Interpreters of Reid seem to be divided in evaluating the significance of his geometry of visibles in the history of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. (...) The question will be reexamined with particular attention given to his unpublished manuscripts. These include comments on Saccheri’s work and Reid’s repeated attempts to derive Euclid’s parallel postulate from the axioms of incidence. (shrink)

The first essay is one of the most influential papers ever written on Lonergan; it and the second one inquire into the notion of the a priori. The third essay presents a detailed analysis of Kantian intuitionism and contrasts it with the 'knowledge as structure' position of Lonergan's critical realism. In this essay intuitionism is generalized, to allow Sala to address representatives of neoscholasticism as well. The argument with neoscholasticism continues in the fourth essay.

Thomas Reid presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). The axioms of this geometry are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. The ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. In a recent article, James Van Cleve has argued that Reid can secure a non-Euclidean geometry of visibles only at the cost of (...) abandoning his direct realist theory of perception, and reintroducing sense-data. The question will be reexamined by considering two aspects of Reid’s theory of vision: the claim that we do not directly perceive distance by sight and Reid’s characterization of visible figure as a partial notion of an external object. (shrink)

The article tries to retrace the emergence of kant's "critique of pure reason". Already in the sixties, Kant faced the problem of metaphysics and came to the result that the conclusions of pure reason have only a subjective value. Hereby the material content of transcendental dialectic was reached. Only afterwards kant examined the underlying ontology and came to his transcendental idealism. On this new base kant should have had to revise his former critique of special metaphysics. However, He did this (...) only partially. (shrink)